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INTRODUCTION 
One current controlling paradigm of American 
constitutional theory is that in order to function properly, the 
Supreme Court must have enduring public support. 3 Working 
within this paradigm, Theunis Roux in his new book offers an 
account of the South African Constitutional Court's (hereinafter: 
SACC) adjudication in the first decade of its existence. Yet Roux 
encountered a puzzle. The SACC functioned properly without 
possessing enduring public support. Rather than abandoning the 
American paradigm, Roux attempted to somehow reconcile the 
reality of the SACC's low public support with the logic of this 
controlling paradigm. In this review I argue that Roux's findings 
justify narrowing the scope of the paradigm and acknowledging 
that a national high court can function properly without public 
support so long as the executive branch views the Court as an 
expert. Moreover, I argue that this revisionist position has ancient 
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3. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 221 (2002) ("IM!any 
commentators made the point that judicial power ultimately depended upon popular 
acceptance."); Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Opinions, M 
WASil. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2007) ("Like anyone who docs not live on a desert 
island, the Court, in order to achieve its goals, has to he concerned with what other people 
think of it. ... IT!hc Court must take care to hchavc in a way that inspires or maintains 
puhlic confidence .... "). 
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roots in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 78. 4 I explain that 
only with the rise of public opinion polls did the notion that the 
United States Supreme Court needs public support to function 
properly ascend to the level of a controlling paradigm. 
I begin by presenting Raux's thesis as an application of the 
controlling legitimacy paradigm. After exposing the roots of this 
paradigm in the peculiar history of the United States Supreme 
Court, I explore Raux's actual findings as verifying a different 
theory, the Hamiltonian one that explains courts' power and 
legitimacy as based on their expertise. According to this theory, 
the SACC could function properly even without public support 
since the executive believed that the Court held expertise, i.e., the 
governing elites believed that the judges are constitutional 
"doctors." Before concluding, I examine Raux's portrayal of the 
SACC's judges. According to Roux, the judges behaved as 
strategic players, i.e., they were cognizant of the basic idea of the 
legitimacy paradigm and acted strategically in order to recruit 
public support. Based on his description, I show that belief in legal 
expertise was prevalent among judges and the legal elites during 
the Chaskalson Court era. 
I. THE CONTROLLING PARADIGM AN[> ROUX'S 
THESIS 
Roux has written a magnificent book. Many texts that aim to 
explain the work of national high courts offer either an account of 
courts as strategic players or a thick description in which courts 
are part of larger political and cultural arenas. 5 Each type of 
account is prone to a set of problems. Scholars who produce 
accounts according to the strategic line of thought reduce complex 
human beings to the figures of "players," who act solely according 
to their calculation of gains and losses.(, Under such a worldview, 
belief in ideas, such as truth, independent of its instrumental-
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 7X, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacoh E. Cook cd., 
1961). 
5. Sec, for example, with regards to the Israeli Supreme Court, MENACHEM 
MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 54-1 XO (2011) (presenting a thick 
description of Israeli society and the Supreme Court as an important player in societal 
development); SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS 163-212 (2015) 
(presenting a strategic analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court's behavior). 
6. See William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172-74 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shcpslc 
cds., 1990). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 523 
strategic value does not exist. 7 Scholars who produce thick 
descriptions attempt to avoid reductionism by purporting to 
capture reality in its fullness.~ Yet absent a narrative, without an 
organizing idea, the data they collected would be unmanageable. 
Thus, these types of accounts are prone to disregard data that do 
not fit their narrative or narrate the data in a manner that fits the 
organizing idea through which the scholar views reality. 
Well aware of these limitations, Roux covers the SACC's 
work from both vantage points. He acknowledges that one cannot 
collapse one framework into the other without losing something 
substantial (p. 124). Thus, he adopts a "two-pronged approach" 
that explains the SACC's work in "rational choice terms'' but also 
in terms of "ideas, personalities, traditions and broader social 
processes" (p. 124). This approach, coupled with his intellectual 
honesty, leads Roux to present data that discredit one vantage 
point but ensure a full presentation of the other. 
Roux is writing under what he calls the "legitimacy theory" 
(p. 37) and what I dub the "legitimacy paradigm." The difference 
in titles is significant. A theory still needs to be tested. Roux never 
doubts the legitimacy "theory." He assumes its validity. He then 
applies it under more stringent conditions as if he was working 
within a scientific paradigm. 9 
According to the legitimacy paradigm, "a certain level of 
public support is a precondition for whatever else a constitutional 
court may hope to achieve" (p. 37). The method of assessing 
public support, under this paradigm, is public opinion polling. In 
other words, in order to function properly, the SACC must 
possess enduring public support as measured in opinion polls. 
Yet, Roux cannot deny that "the South African case appears to 
defy this rule" (p. 37). There were "certain brute facts about the 
Chaskalson Court's institutional legitimacy" (p. 34) that could not 
be squared with the legitimacy paradigm. Surveys conducted by 
James Gibson and Gregory Calderia in 1996-1997, 2001 and 2004 
7. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THI' CiVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
194 (2014) (arguing that within the rational choice "framework, 'rational' politicians arc 
exclusively concerned with the pursuit of electoral advantage .... Anything else is 
'irrational' -it happens sometimes hut should he seen as ahcrrational."). 
R See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 35 (1999) ("Scholars such 
as Clifford Gccrtz and Michel Foucault emphasize that social practices arc historically 
specific and that each such practice must he approached through a process of thick 
description."). 
9. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (2nd 
cd. 1970). 
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showed that the Court never cultivated enduring public support. 10 
No other opinion polls covering the first ten years of the SACC 
exist, as the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) began 
measuring public confidence in the SACC only in 2006. 11 "[T]he 
Court," writes Roux, "handed down a number of decisions in 
politically controversial cases, all of which were enforced, and 
none of which triggered a debilitating attack on the Court" (p. 3). 
However, as Roux acknowledges, "the Court never built much 
institutional legitimacy (in the sense of 'diffuse support') .... " (p. 
4). He thus concludes that "the interesting thing about the 
Chaskalson Court is that it was able to play its constitutionally 
assigned veto role from the very outset, and that it continued to 
play this role without ever building much institutional legitimacy" 
(p. 4; see also pp. 15, 37-38). By examining the Chaskalson Court's 
adjudication, Roux attempts to explain this puzzle. He endeavors 
to show how the Court's adjudication during its first ten years of 
existence does not contradict the legitimacy paradigm. 
Yet, Roux does not raise the possibility that his work 
disproves the controlling American paradigm and that in certain 
circumstances national high courts do not need public support to 
function properly. Instead, Roux in part capitulates to the 
controlling paradigm. He does not view the ten first years of the 
Court as a complete success since "the Court never built the kind 
of public support that is ordinarily taken to be the mark of a 
successful constitutional court" (p. 391 ). This partial capitulation 
is surprising since Roux acknowledges the uniqueness of the 
American case that triggered the rise of the legitirnacy paradigm. 
He explains that 
In most mature constitutional democracies, where the legal-
professional culture is premised on a relatively strong 
attachment to the ideal of adjudication according to law, and 
where all major political actors support the need for judicial 
10. James L. Gihson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Defenders of Democracy? l-egitimacy, 
Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court, 65 .J. POL. 1, 11 (2003) 
("From a comparative perspective, the South African Constitutional Court has failed to 
develop a very deep reservoir of goodwill among the South African mass puhlic."); James 
L. Gihson, The Evolving Legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court, in JUSTICE 
AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 221}, 246-50 (Fran~ois du 
Bois & Antje du Bois-Pedain eds., 200X) (arguing hased on survey conducted in 2004 that 
the SACC enjoys "low to moderate level of support .... ISjupport fm the Constitutional 
Court seemed to change little hetween Jl)l)7 and 2004 .... ITihe minimalist conclusion to 
he drawn is that the Court has not hroadened its support in the seven years hctween the 
first and last surveys."). 
11. See THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION, http://www.ijr.org 
.za/political-analysis-SARB.php (last visited Sept. l), 2015). 
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independence, the tension between law and politics recedes to 
the background, arising only in isolated cases when a 
particularly controversial case brings it to the surface (p. X9). 
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In a footnote he notes that "[t]he major exception is the United 
States" (p. 89 n.30; see also p. 102). Indeed, in the American 
public discourse, belief that legal expertise resolves constitutional 
questions has eroded, making the gartisan aspect of the Court's 
adjudication much more salient. 2 But if the United States 
Supreme Court presents such a sui generis case, why assume that 
the paradigm through which it is studied will fit the SACC? 
David Robertson provides a potential explanation in his 
comparative study of several national high courts. Robertson 
suggests that the approach to the study of courts worldwide was 
devised based on the very unique context of the United States 
Supreme Court as a result of American academic dominance in 
the field of social science. 13 This American-based approach, so 
says Robertson, should not be exported so easily to other 
countries. 14 Similarly, Gibson and Caldeira, two of the most 
prominent scholars of the "legitimacy paradigm," admit in their 
article on the South African Constitutional Court that while 
"legitimacy theory is widely accepted by scholars ... it is unclear 
that extant findings, mostly on the U.S., are generalizable to other 
political and legal systems." 15 While Roux acknowledges the 
influence of the American way of thinking on his work (p. 17), he 
cannot break free from this American paradigm. Since for Roux 
this paradigm is necessarily true, he writes that "the Court could 
not escape the fact that its institutional role and thereby also its 
institutional independence was premised on the Court's capacity 
to sustain the public's faith in the impartiality of its interpretive 
practices." (pp. 206-207). 
12. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 2() J.L. & PoL. 23<) (2011) 
(describing the decline of legal expertise in the American public mind). 
13. DAVID ROBERTSON, THE JUDGE AS POLITICALTIIEORIST 21 (201 0) ("The first 
characteristic of most political science research on courts is that it is American. It is either 
written by Americans (about American courts- the largest single category by a long way 
- or about other courts) or, less common, written by non-Americans about other courts 
but in a way heavily influenced by American paradigms."). 
14. !d. at 25-2() ("INion-American courts arc much less obviously political actors, 
and much more cautious ones .... Political science models may more effectively apply to 
American than to non-American courts simply because those models arc assessing a 
different reality. Therefore, they should be exported with care."). 
15. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 10, at 2-3. 
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II. ROUX'S REVOLUTIONARY FINDINGS 
A. FLAWS IN THE LEGITIMACY PARADIGM 
Many American scholars present the controlling legitimacy 
paradigm as a paraphrase of Hamilton's argument regarding the 
judiciary's limited power in Federalist No. 78. 16 This lends the 
paradigm an aura of a timeless truth. For example, in their work 
"On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," Gibson, Caldeira, 
and Baird write that " [ n ]ot even the most powerful courts in the 
world have the power of the 'purse' or 'sword~'; with limited 
institutional resources, courts are therefore uncommonly 
dependent upon the goodwill of their constituents for both 
support and compliance . . . courts, more than other political 
institutions, require a deep reservoir of goodwill.''' 17 The authors 
then use public opinion polls to measure that "reservoir of 
goodwill." However, the Federalist No. 78 reads differently. 
Alexander Hamilton proclaimed there that "[t]he judiciary on the 
contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse ... It 
may truly be said to have neither Force nor Wi[ll, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgrnents." 1x As I 
explain at length elsewhere, 19 according to Hamilton, the 
government's support is the essential component for the efficacy 
of the Court's rulings. This support is acquired because the 
executive branch acknowledges the value of the Court's judgment 
and not because it is fearful of public reaction if it :fails to comply 
with the Court's decisions. Even if the Court gives a judgment that 
is contrary to popular opinion or to the government's interests, 
16. See, e.g., TOMS. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 67 (2011) 
("Indeed, at least since Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist #78 that the Court is 
'possessed of neither force nor will, hut merely judgment,' students of American 
government have recognized that the Court is limited in its efficacy hy the necessity of 
public and political will to give its decisions force."); Christopher D. Johnston & Brandon 
L. Bartels, Sensationalism and Sobriety Differential Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward 
American Courts, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 260,276 (2010) (''The support of the general public 
is essential to the American court system, as judges possess neither powers of 
appropriation nor of sanction."); Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63,75 (2004) ("Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command 
the military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners public 
acceptance."). 
17. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy 
of National lligh Courts, Y2(2) AM. POL Sci. REV. 343,343 (199X). 
1X. THE FEDERALIST No. 7X, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 
1961). 
19. See Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 32 ST. LOUIS lJ. PUB. 
L. REV. 333, 36X-76 (2012). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 527 
the government may still enforce the judgment in the same way a 
patient may comply with a treatment that causes her pain. Thus, 
Hamilton based the Court's power '"merel~" on its judicial 
expertise; not on public support for the Court. 0 According to the 
legitimacy paradigm, the government's support is given because it 
makes a strategic calculation on public support for the Court, 21 
rather than because the executive believes in the Court's 
expertise. Public opinion is the drive wheel of American politics, 
and the government does not usually stand against a popular 
institution. Moreover, according to this paradigm, even if the 
Court is perceived to act politically, i.e., not as an expert, as long 
as it retains public confidence, political resistance to its decisions 
is unfeasible because the political costs of attacking the Court are 
too high (p. 161 ). 22 
The invention of public opinion polls changed how the term 
legitimacy is understood, at least in the United States. This shift 
has had an especially important impact on courts. First, the term 
is now understood more and more in sociological terms (whether 
a court has legitimacy in the eyes of the public) rather than in 
normative terms (whether a court has legitimacy as a matter of 
normative justification).23 Second, courts now have the ability, for 
the first time in their history, to base their legitimacy on public 
support rather than on expertise. 24 Those who hold political power 
have listened to public opinion well before the invention of public 
opinion polls, but the manner in which public opinion is voiced 
20. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 54 (1999) 
(explaining that according to Alexander Hamilton, "the court's only claim to authority is 
the force of its reason and the clear accuracy of its decision."). 
21. See MATTHEW E.K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER 15-1X 
(2011) ("[T[hc Court, like most political authorities, must rely on other political actors to 
implement its decisions .... These other government actors may also he under strong 
political pressure from superiors or electoral constituents to ignore the Court. ... [ E [lectcd 
officials may he unwilling or unable to resist the Court when it is supported hy strong public 
opinion."). 
22. See generally JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDt·:S OF CONSENT, at xvi (2004) ("Public 
opinion matters .... Its power is that it points always to the future, telling those whose 
careers and strategies depend on public support that success depends on being with the 
tide, not against it."); CLARK, supra note 16, at X1-X2 ("[M[cmhcrs of Congress will 
generally have an interest in correctly position-taking in line with public opinion, which is 
a central activity in the pursuit of reelection."). 
23. See Bassok, supra note 19, at 335-43 (explaining the change in the way scholars 
confront the countcrmajoritarian difficulty: from a problem that requires a normative 
justification to a problem that requires showing that the Supreme Court docs not 
contradict public opinion). 
24. See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy. 16 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 153, 197 (2013) ("Public support as a basis of legitimacy is no longer the 
monopoly of the elected branches. The Court can now rely, even if only tacitly, on public 
support for the Court as a viable, independent basis of legitimacy."). 
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has changed. Until the invention of public opinion polls, Congress 
was public opinion. 25 Countering the will of Congress meant 
contravening the will of the majority of the public. But with the 
rise of public opinion culture things have changed. Public opinion 
polls are now the main mechanism through which the public will 
is represented and thus legitimacy has become in many ways 
synonymous with public support as expressed in opinion polls. As 
a result of these two developments, together with the 
measurement of public support for the United States Supreme 
Court since the 1960s, the Supreme Court now has the ability, for 
the first time in history, to base its legitimacy on public support 
rather than on expertise. 
Imagine the era before the invention of opinion polls. During 
that period, Roux's idea of "a people's court, with its own 
constituency independent of the ANC" (p. 379) would seem 
problematic, to say the least. How can the Court, even tacitly, 
claim to have the people's "vote" in any conflict with the people's 
representatives? With no ability to reliably de1nonstrate this 
support to the political branches, the value of the Court's claim 
would be very low. No independent public indicator could back 
up this claim to public legitimacy in a clash with the elected 
branches. Of course, even before the invention of public opinion 
polls, the claim that unelected institutions require public support 
to function properly was raised. 26 Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court did speak in the name of the people or rely on 
"public confidence" for the Court even before the invention of 
public opinion polls. 27 But, the understanding of what it means for 
the Court to hold public confidence was different .. For example, 
the view that the government as a whole requires public support 
(rather than individual institutions) was the controlling view 
before the invention of public polling. 2x 
After the invention of public opinion polls, the claim that 
courts possess public support can hold its ground in public 
25. Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 72 THE HISTORIAN 
321,323-24,341 (2010). 
26. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776-17X7, at 135 (1972) ("In classical Whig thought all rulers, whether English kings or 
Venetian doges, supposedly derived their powers ultimately from the people; election only 
made explicit what was always implicit."); id. at 612 (discussing the eighteenth century view 
that all power was "derived from the puhlic opinion.") (quoting Samuel Williams). 
27. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 614, 61X (1X40) (Baldwin, J., concurring) 
(asserting that the Court's power "is moral, not physical; it operates hy its influence, hy 
puhlic confidence in the soundness and uniformity of the principles on which it acts."). 
2R See Bassok, supra note 24, at 160 (describing the position that the legitimacy of 
the system as a whole depends on puhlic opinion). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 529 
discourse as long as polls demonstrate such support. But, while in 
the United States every salient issue is probed in polls by the 
media, including questions regarding Supreme Court cases,29 
Roux does not present any evidence of similar polling frenzy in 
South Africa. In his account of the SACC's first ten years, he 
relies on only three public opinion poll surveys that measured 
support for the Court and another poll measuring support for the 
Court's death penalty decision (p. 238). In view of the scarcity of 
public opinion polls, his claim that the SACC's ability to function 
properly between 1995 and 2005 was connected to public's 
support for the Court stands on a shaky ground, even if these four 
surveys had demonstrated broad support for the Court. Public 
support for courts, with the exception of rare occasions when it is 
manifested in elections that are focused on court-related issues, is 
not by itself an exercise of power. People with power listen to it. 30 
Yet, in the current era, in order for public opinion to be listened 
to, it needs to be measured and made public or to be manifested 
through serious public mobilization. Thus, the Court does not 
need to state that it holds public support, but other institutions 
need to be aware of a reliable metric demonstrating such support. 
Otherwise, without a belief in the court's expertise, they may 
disregard the court's decisions if their only merit is the decider's 
unsupported claim to hold public support. After all, elected 
representatives view their voice as the best proxy for public 
support. 
B. THE LEGITIMACY BASED ON EXPERTISE EXPLANATION 
It is not only the use of public opinion polls, coupled with the 
shift in how legitimacy is understood (public opinion culture), that 
differentiates the American reality and the South African one. 
After all, under the same conditions, it is difficult to find anyone 
claiming that the American Federal Reserve Bank's proper 
function is dependent on it holding public support. The Federal 
Reserve Bank was designed as an expert institution, 
unaccountable to the public that offers judgments in its realm of 
expertise. 31 At least until recently, it was almost undisputed for 
29. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNOUIST COURT 3-4 
(200R) (presenting data on the high frc4ucncy of puhlic polling with regard to the 
American Supreme Court). 
30. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 190 (2007) (arguing that modern puhlic-
sphcrc "is supposed to he listened to hy power, hut it is not itself an exercise of power."). 
31. JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE 
POLITICS OF MONETARY POLICY RR (19R4) ("The Federal Reserve depends on expertise, 
and economists arc the relevant experts."). 
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many decades that the executive complies with the Federal 
Reserve judgments because of its expertise, not because of its 
popular support. 32 Why is the United States Supreme Court 
different? What comes to mind immediately is that non-
compliance with the Federal Reserve judgment is like refusing to 
adhere to a doctor's medical advice. 33 But judges seem to be 
perceived differently than economists. At least with regards to 
salient constitutional cases, such as those dealing with the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, the American public's 
belief that the Justices possess any relevant expertise to decide 
these questions has weakened. 34 Without such expertise, all the 
judiciary has is indeed public support. The Federal Reserve Bank 
and its decisions to influence the interest rates are regarded 
differently. This difference in how Americans imagine these two 
institutions is a result of contingent historical developments. Since 
the clash between FD R and the Court over the New Deal 
legislation, the public's understanding that legal expertise does 
not provide the Court with determinate answers in constitutional 
cases, and that the law's malleability allows judges to decide cases 
based on their political preferences, began to spread and has been 
spreading ever since.35 
But it is evident from Roux's book, with regards to the 
SACC, that the way South African governing elites imagine the 
court is different than the way Americans imagine their Supreme 
Court. In other words, Roux depicts how South African elites, 
32. /d. at 57 ("In contrast to incumbents in top posts in other agencies (including the 
Treasury), the Federal Reserve Board has had twice as many holders of doctoral degrees. 
This kind of distribution is exactly what one would expect to find in an agency that relics 
heavily on expertise in the conduct of policy and as a source of legitimacy.''); id. at XX ("The 
Federal Reserve may he the first instance of institutionalized application of economic 
expertise in the service or government."). 
33. Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda ~ and the Nation's, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 54-55 (200()) (claiming that there is almost no discussion of the 
countcrmajoritarian difficulty with regard to the Federal Reserve Board partly because 
"many people hclicvc, rightly or wrongly, that most agency decisions arc hascd on 
technical knowledge which neither the people nor their directly elected representatives 
possess."). 
34. Bassok, supra note 12, at 247-53 (describing the erosion in public perception of 
the Court's expertise); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy's Distrust: Contested Values and the 
Decline of Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) ("IMiany people no longer sec 
judges as possessing legal expertise."). 
35. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 171-72, 223-25 (2009) ("It would he difficult 
to overstate the extent to which the public and commentators had hy mid-century become 
reconciled to Realist (or anti-formalist) conceptions."); Bassok, supra note 12, at 253 
("I Clonstitutional theorists generally agree that the rise in puhllic saliency or the 
indeterminacy of legal norms and the decline of the Court's mythical image date hack to 
the first half of the 20th century."). 
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consisting mostly of the African National Congress Party (ANC), 
still believe in judicial expertise even for salient constitutional 
questions. They still believe in constitutional doctors. The 
executive's compliance with the SACC better resembles 
compliance by the American executive branch with the Federal 
Reserve Bank's directives or Hamilton's vision of the United 
States Supreme Court's basis of legitimacy. Do not dismiss this 
opinion as a form of naivete that cannot really exist or as 
something that could exist only when the world was young. 
Economics is still considered in the United States to be a form of 
expertise to which a different section is dedicated in newspapers 
(as opposed to legal issues that appear in the general "news" 
section). How can one argue otherwise? After all, there are a lot 
of numbers and large spreadsheets in the economics section. 
Obviously, only experts may really discern developments in the 
world of economics. However, after the economic crisis of 2008, 
one can easily see beyond this horizon and imagine a world in 
which the salient decisions of the Federal Bank are considered as 
political as the Court's decisions. 36 The Federal Reserve would be 
considered as a bunch of conservative, Republican economists 
trying, in a countermajoritarian manner, to hinder the Democratic 
President's progressive economic policy in the name of their false 
expertise. After all, it would be well known that the President's 
contradictory policy is supported by his own bunch of Democratic 
economic "experts." Such developments, in which a field of 
expertise is no longer imagined as such, do occur. As already 
noted, the fallout of the struggle over the New Deal between FDR 
and the United States Supreme Court is one example of this 
37 process. 
Roux only partly capitulates to the "legitimacy paradigm." 
His analysis from the vantage point of culture and politics 
provides a recipe for how a national high court, such as the SACC, 
can properly function without public support. The first condition 
is the existence of a dominant political force that controls the 
executive. This condition ensures that the Court will not be used 
as a pawn in a struggle between political forces (pp. 125-126). The 
36. RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 169 (2007) (arguing that 
''disputes hctwccn economists over different approaches to monetary policy" arc examples 
of disputes that involve "potentially contentious moral and ideological judgments at some 
level or another."). 
37. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARY. 
L. REV. 1147, 1157 (1993) (noting that after the New Deal, the he lief that constitutionalism 
is a special expression of reason or science was undermined, and that constitutionalism 
"appeared simply as another instance of rule hy political interests."). 
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second condition is that the dominant political force consists of 
believers in judicial expertise. 
Roux links the dominance of a single political party in South 
Africa (the ANC) to the SACC's ability to defy the legitimacy 
paradigm. He writes that "the Court was continually able to defy 
the ordinary assumptions of liberal constitutional theory by 
exploiting the ANC's dominance to carve out a role for itself as 
an independent check on the abuse of political power" (p. 363). 
He repeatedly states that "[t]he main deterrninant of the 
Chaskalson Court's insulation from political attack must have 
been the ANC's interest in its independence" (p. 144; see also pp. 
125-26, 186-87). For example, he explains that in the salient 
decision to abolish the death penalty (S. v. Makwanyane) the 
Court's ability to reject "the content of public opinion as a 
determinant of constitutional meaning" was "crucially dependent 
on the ANC's capacity as a dominant political party to insulate 
the Court from political attacks" (p. 238; see alsop. 390). At times 
the Court even forfeited opportunities to recruit public support in 
order to ensure the ANC's backing (p. 378). 
To establish the existence of the second condition- the belief 
of the dominant political force in judicial expertise- Roux relies 
on historical scholarship other than his own. He presents the 
origins of the South African elites' belief in legal expertise as 
emerging from the process of colonial state formation and the rise 
of apartheid (pp. 191, 197). Based on Martin Chanock's work, 
Roux explains that "[i]n a country where law was so obviously 
deployed as an instrument of social control and oppression, 
lawyers' discourse on law played the role-common to most legal-
professional cultures, but intensified in the particular 
circumstances of South Africa- of separating the realm of the 
legal from the political" (p. 195). This legacy was persevered after 
1993, as "the positive memory of formally rational law played a 
crucial role in the transition to democracy, functioning as a shared 
'mental model' that supplied the 'trust' required to drive the 
negotiation process forward" (p. 196). Thus, although according 
to the strategic model all politicians are merely strategic players 
who are not persuaded by arguments but only driven by their 
interest to be reelected, Roux cannot disregard the data from the 
cultural vantage point. The historical data reveals that given this 
legacy of judicial expertise, some of the ANC's leaders, and in 
particular Nelson Mandela, just believed in complying with the 
SACC's decisions, since they believed in its expertise even when 
the SACC ruled against their interest (pp. 127, 173, 189). Even 
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with rifts inside the ANC during the Mbeki presidency, and the 
decline of strategic reasons for part of the ANC leadership to 
support the Court, "very few attacks on the Court were in fact 
launched, and none that could be described as successful" (pp. 
186-187). The belief in the SACC's expertise was not necessarily 
a belief only in judicial expertise in legal doctrine (though that 
existed as welCx). Rather, as Roux explains, the ANC obeyed the 
Court during the Chaskalson era given its commitment to human 
rights, and because the Court was perceived as an expert in human 
rights (p. 388). 39 
According to Roux, the separation of law and politics, as well 
as viewing the Court's work as purely legal, is still the 
predominant way of thinking among South African elites (pp. 112, 
213, 219, 382). Thus, the Court's decisions have been understood 
by the elites as the decisions of an expert (pp. 3, 15). For this 
reason, diverting from a "legally compelled" approach implies 
heavy reputationallosses to the SACC (p. 289). Similarly, since 
the elites comply with the Court's decisions because of its 
expertise instead of its public support, it is not surprising that 
Roux distinguishes between the United States and South Africa 
in terms of the role of public opinion in determining the Court's 
power. He explains that in Makwanyane the ANC's support was 
able to "cushion" the Court from the adverse effects of public 
opinion, in comparison to the United States where public opinion 
has a more "powerful role" (p. 175 & n.1 01 ). 
As long as the ANC is politically dominant and as long as 
belief in legal expertise is dominant among the elites, the SACC 
will function properly (pp. 175, 182). It might have decided 
contrary to public opinion as well as contrary to the ANC's view, 
but as long as it was perceived to follow the directives of its expert 
knowledge, the ANC complied. The Court did not have the sword 
or the purse, only judgment, and that worked fine. In this spirit, 
Roux explains that its "light case load" allowed the Court 
to concentrate on the careful wording of its decision. A strategy 
that was primarily focused, not on popular acceptance of the 
Court's role, but on the political branches' continued support 
3X. Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 7 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 106, 13X (2009) ("ITihe CCSA's reputation for legally credihlc 
decision making lending ... the ANC government's continued respect for, and ohedience 
to, the CCSA 's decisions .... "). 
39. See also Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits 
of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 63, 76-7X, X9 (1997) (detailing the ANC's 
commitment to the language of human rights). 
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for the constitutional project, required the Court to invest a 
considerable amount of time and energy into crafting its 
decisions for maximum justificatory effect (p. 383). 
In other words, the SACC tried to exhibit good judgment and thus 
to persuade the executive to enforce its judgments. 
In an ironic twist, Roux juxtaposes the attitude of American 
scholars towards the Chaskalson Court's record on social rights 
with that of South African scholars. He explains American 
scholars' appreciation of the Court given their acceptance of 
"strategic compromises that constitutional courts rr1ay be required 
to make." Roux points out that since in South Africa, "political 
constraints under which constitutional courts operate are either 
not seen at all or, if seen, are considered to be irrelevant to legal-
academic criticism," South African scholars are much more 
critical of the Court's record in this realm (p. 264 ). In essence, 
Roux argues that in South Africa the belief in legal expertise is 
such that scholars refuse to accept not following the correct result, 
according to expert knowledge, in the name of strategic 
considerations. One is thus left wondering why Roux adopts an 
American paradigm to explain how the SACC can function 
properly in the South African context.40 
Thus, in my view, the takeaway message from Roux's book is 
that, as opposed to the controlling legitimacy paradigm, national 
high courts do not need public support to function properly. As 
long as the controlling elites perceive their national high court as 
an expert in law and adopt its advice like a patient adopts her 
doctor's advice, the court will be able to function properly, even 
without public support. Exactly as the Federal Reserve Bank's 
judgment in the United States is adopted by the executive, even 
when it contradicts public opinion, since it is understood to be 
based on expertise in economics, national high courts' judgments 
can be adopted since they are understood to be based on judicial 
expertise. As long as the executive is persuaded by the Court's 
expertise and the system of governance as a whole possesses 
public confidence, public support of a national high court is not 
crucial for its proper function. 41 The South African Constitutional 
40. Cf Gihson & Caldeira, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that "it is unclear to what 
degree findings'' that cstahlish the legitimacy paradigm in "long-cstahlishcd democratic 
politics can he generalized to the world's emerging democracies."). 
41. C). Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, Y3 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3X (1 Y7Y) 
("Legitimacy docs not depend on popular approval of the institution's performance .... 
It is the legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends on the people's approval, 
and that is the source of its democratic character."). 
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Court's experience in its first ten years, as depicted by Roux, 
validates this argument. 
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
AS A STRATEGIC PLAYER 
The question of whether the Court can function properly 
without public support is distinct from the question of whether 
judges believe that the Court requires such support and whether 
they take into account public opinion in their adjudication. The 
latter question concerns how judges decide cases. Roux is 
interested in all of these questions. So far I have discussed only 
the first question. Although the other questions are not at the 
center of my review, Roux's discussion of the judges' strategic 
behavior serves as a good indication of the judges' "legal 
consciousness" or shared beliefs. 42 It reveals the prevalence of the 
belief in legal expertise among elites during the Chaskalson Court 
era. 
In his discussion of how the SACC's judges decided cases, 
Roux adopts the strategic approach and assumes that judges 
belie_ved that .in order to fulfil t~e.ir preferred policX the Court 
requires pubhc support (the legitimacy paradigm).· However, 
since Roux shows that the SACC did not require public support 
to function properly, much of his analysis actually shows how the 
Court acted strategically to preserve the AN C's support (pp. 288-
290, 388). This "managerialist strategy" (p. 392) relies on premises 
that are closer to Hamilton's manner of thinking than to the 
legitimacy paradigm. 44 
42. Cf Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850~1940, in 3 
RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3, 6 (J. Spitzer cd., 1l)XO) ("The notion hchind the 
concept of legal consciousness is that people can have in common something more 
inllucntial than a checklist of facts, techniques, and opinions. They can share premises 
ahout the salient aspects of the legal order that arc so hasic that actors rarely if ever hring 
them consciously to mind."). 
43. C}. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, TilE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 4X~4t) (1 Y9X) 
(explaining that justices protect the Court's institutional legitimacy "as a means to an end 
~a policy end."); HAIL, supra note 21, at 7 ("I take as assumed, as is common in the judicial 
politics literature, that Supreme Court justices arc political actors with policy preferences 
~ that is, preferences regarding policy outcomes ~ and Court decisions arc rcllcctions of 
those preferences."). 
44. But it docs not contradict the strategic approach because this approach is not 
restricted to the idea that judges seck puhlic support. See HALL, supra note 21, at 11 
("Typically, rational choice theorists assume that justices arc 'single-minded seekers of 
legal policy,' hut that not need he the case. It is up to the researcher to specify the content 
of actors' goals, and a few have explored objectives other than policy."). 
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Roux presents SACC Judge Laurie Ackermann as having "a 
profound sense of the determinacy of law as a professional 
discipline" (p. 225). While, according to Roux, other judges did 
not share this "sense" and viewed law also as a means to an end, 
"[a ]II of them had been socialized in a legal-professional culture 
in which the distinction between law and politics was highly 
valued" (p. 230; see also p. 120). Thus, the South African judges 
continued to view the "maintenance of the public's faith in the 
ideal of adjudication according to the law as an essential 
component of their work," not merely out of "strategic 
advantage" but also out of "sincere commitment" to this ideal (p. 
383; see also pp. 7-8). They "chose to present their decisions as 
legally compelled" (p. 388). The idea of more openness to the 
political nature of adjudication was "never really on the cards" (p. 
384). Roux concludes his book stating that "[w]hile the Court's 
decision-making record may be criticized for n1aintaining an 
overly strict, and at times strained, conception of the law/politics 
distinction, the judges' commitment to the liberal-legalist ideal 
underlying this conception was sincere and genuine" (p. 387). 
In comparison, American Justices are quite explicit today in 
their belief in the need for public support for the Court. 45 For 
example, in his book, Making Our Democracy Work-A Judge's 
View, Justice Stephen Breyer states that "[t]he Court itself must 
help maintain the public's trust in the Court" in order to ensure 
its proper function. 46 The controversy between current justices is 
on how to acquire such support. Note that I do not claim that 
American 1 ustices state that the Court must follow public opinion. 
Public support for an institution can be achieved by maintaining 
its image as an expert that sometimes decides against public 
opinion.47 Roux does not present evidence about the SACC 
judges' views as to whether the Court needs public support. 
Indeed, Raux's description of the judicial mindset of the 
Chaskalson Court is consistent with a belief in expertise as the 
Court's source of power rather than public support. 
The question of whether judicial adherence to expertise as 
the Court's source of legitimacy can be adequately depicted using 
45. Bassok, supra note 12, at 25H--63 (surveying examples from recent years of 
justices expressing their concern of puhlic confidence for the Court which they view as vital 
for its proper function). 
46. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK, at xiii (2010). 
47. For distinguishing he tween these two positions, see Or Bassok, The Court Cannot 
Hold, 30 J.L. & POL. 1, 37-3H (2014). 
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the strategic approach is beyond the scope of this review. 4x At one 
point Roux claimed that "[t]he more legally compelled" a certain 
approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, "the heavier 
the reputational losses attendant on rejecting it would have 
been .... " (p. 289). Following this argument, one can translate an 
expert's adherence to her expertise out of a belief in its intrinsic 
value into a strategy for reputational gains. Thus, the Court's 
tendency to adhere to the same doctrinal test in different fields, a 
tendency that fits well the consistency and coherency of a legal 
expert, "suggest[ s ]," according to Roux, "that more than a mere 
doctrinal preference was at work" (p. 323). The strategic prism 
leads Roux to conclude that the Court's adoption of "similar tests 
from such different starting point suggests ... that the Court was 
shaping the law to suit the long-term performance of its 
institutional role in two inherently controversial areas of its 
mandate" (p. 323). Consider the example of a doctor who 
consistently prescribes a certain kind of antibiotics for several 
similar illnesses out of a belief in the drug's efficacy. How would 
you react to the suggestion that he does so out of strategic 
calculation for enhancing his reputation among the drug 
companies? What makes Roux conclude that the Court's 
adherence to expertise is strategic rather than sincere? 
Interestingly, Herman Pritchett, one of the fathers of the 
strategic approach, apparently thought that before the spike in 
American Justices' dissents at the beginning of the 1930s, the 
strategic approach was not the most adequate one to explain the 
United States Supreme Court's judgments. 49 Viewing judicial 
adherence to expertise as an instrument to recruit public support 
is not an adequate explanation during periods in which the culture 
of expertise reigns high. During these periods, the Court's 
legitimacy was not understood in terms of public support. 5° 
4~. For such an attempt, sec, for example, LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 54 (2013) ("Doctrines such 
as plain meaning ... and stare decisis ... cnahle judges ... to minimize controversy with 
other hranchcs of government hy appearing to play a modest 'professional' role .... "). 
49. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 43, at 24; C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 22 (1954) ("It is precisely hccausc the Court's 
institutional ethos has hccomc so weak that we must examine the thinking of the individual 
justices ... . ");see also EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4~, at 66--fl7 (noting that 
Pritchett "is rightly regarded as the founder of the quantitative social-scientific study of 
judicial hchavior. "). 
50. Determining the periods in which the culture of expertise reigned high is a 
complex affair. It should he noted, however, that in the U.S. the process was not linear in 
the sense of a continuous decline of the hdicf in expertise. 
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Many viable perspectives are available for describing 
phenomena. 51 One can describe a person to her friend by giving 
the exact proportions of the chemical elements from which his 
body was composed at that moment. Such a description offers the 
most accurate scientific depiction of him currently available. Yet 
it would be difficult to recognize him on the street according to 
this description. One can analyze the question of whether a 
woman is allowed to discriminate against white people and date 
only black women according to legal analysis. After all, as Aharon 
~arak and Elena Kagan tau&ht us, "l~w is everywhere"52 and. "it 
Is law all the way down."-- Yet, this would be a categoncal 
mistake, at least according to our current understandings of 
choices in the realm of personal relationships. Viable perspectives 
of this kind can be deployed so as to encompass every human 
action under their wings. 54 This is surely true with regards to the 
strategic approach that can narrate any act as part of a strategy 
for achieving a certain goae5 For example, one can describe 
scholars who adhere to the legitimacy paradig1m as strategic 
players rather than as scientists dedicated to finding the truth. 
According to this description scholars would prefer to follow the 
controlling scientific Zeitgeist that views courts as strategic 
players, rather than jeopardize their career by adhering only to 
the contrasting findings and encountering great opposition within 
their discipline. 56 As for judicial decisions, as Robertson noted, 
"[o]ne can frequently come up with a plausible post hoc account 
of why a decision could have been strategic, whatever the judges 
claimed as their reasoning." 57 The only question is whether it is 
51. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (Keith Anscii-
Pcarson cd., Carol Dicthc trans., 1 YY4) (IHX7); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO 
POWER§§ 1H1, 530 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdalc trans., 1%7) (1Y01). 
52. Owen Fiss, Law Is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 256, 25Y (2007) (explaining 
Barak's ideas). 
53. Bassok, supra note 47, at40--41 (explaining the ideology hchind Kagan's quote). 
54. C'f. Kahn, supra note X, at 102 (noting that with regards to the political and legal 
perspectives that "]tjhcsc arc systems of meaning, each of which can he deployed within 
and ahout all of our political institutions."). 
55. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREMI~ COURT AND THE 
ATITrUDINAL MODEL REVISITED YH (2002) (explaining that rational choice theory "for 
the most part" cannot he falsified since "]ijf any goals arc allowed, then there must always 
he goals that can explain the hchavior in question."). 
56. Cf LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 211 (2001) 
("]L]aw and economics advocates might he challenged to explain why their approach 
cannot itself he understood as a rational adaptation to the market fmccs that favored its 
development .... "). 
57. ROBERTSON, supra note 13, at 25; see also Michaela Hailhronncr, Rethinking the 
Rise of the German Constitutional Court: From Anti-Nazism to Value Formalism, 12 INT'L 
J. CONST. L. 626, 63Y (2014) ("Nor should we confine ourselves to looking at constitutional 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 539 
the most adequate perspective. From Roux's description it is 
unclear whether the most adequate perspective to describe the 
SACC's adjudication is the strategic one. 
CONCLUSION 
Gazing through his "constitutional microscope," Theunis 
Roux saw something he was not supposed to see. The SACC 
functioned properly without public support, contrary to the 
current controlling paradigm. As any scholar working within the 
framework of a controlling paradigm, this result puzzled him as it 
defied the entrenched legitimacy paradigm. While Roux 
recognizes that this anomaly challenges the current controlling 
paradigm, he attempts to subordinate it to the logic of the 
paradigm. sH Yet his findings diverge from this framework. They 
demonstrate, contrary to the controlling legitimacy paradigm, 
that national high courts can function properly without public 
support as long as the Court is considered by the governing elite 
to be an expert. One may view Roux's discovery not as disproving 
the ~egit~~acJ' paradigm but simply as narrowing its scope of 
apphcabthty: 
In any event, his discovery signals a major shift in the 
understanding of national high courts. This shift also affects the 
method of inquiry. Having a thick description of the local 
understanding of legal expertise, as Roux offered, is clearly a 
relevant factor for determining national high courts' ability to 
courts merely as strategic actors seeking to carve out a maximum of power for themselves 
in a larger institutional context, thus isolating them from their legal tradition and their 
broader cultural context. J usticcs at constitutional courts have been first and foremost 
educated, worked, and socialized for decades in a legal system before their appointment 
to the court. Unsurprisingly, they will be inllucnced by their specific legal culture, and by 
the more general attitudes towards authority in society."). 
5K Cf KUHN, supra note 9, at 36-37 (explaining the scientist's puzzle-solving 
function during normal science); id. at 46--47, 57-59 ("[T[hc perception of anomaly- of a 
phenomenon, that is, for which his paradigm had not readied the investigator- played an 
essential role in preparing the way for perception of novelty."). 
59. One may argue that the legitimacy paradigm, in certain formulations, can 
incorporate this adjustment. For example, distinguishing between compliance and 
legitimacy allows one to argue that in order to achieve compliance (and thus to function 
properly), a court need not have public legitimacy but only expertise in the eyes of the 
elites. See also KUHN, supra note 9, at 9X-IOO, 122 (discussing the idea of narrowing 
paradigms' range of application in order to salvage them); cf Gibson & Caldeira, supra 
note 10, at 4 (distinguishing between compliance and legitimacy). 
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function properly. Mere measurements of public support fail to 
capture the entire picture. 60 
60. See KUHN, supra note 9, at 5X-61 (explaining that shifts in paradigms hring shifts 
in the standard tests we usc to understand reality); id. at 126 ("[O[pcrations and 
measurements arc paradigm-determined."). 
